Boy, this article and the comments are so wrong I almost don't know where to begin. There follows a slightly edited version of my comment on the article.
NGSCB and No Execute are completely different things. No Execute applies only - I emphasize ONLY - to the ability to tell the processor not to execute code from given pages. Because Windows is a protected-mode operating system, only the kernel can set or clear this bit in the Page Table Entry. NX can help prevent the exploit of buffer overrun bugs.
Windows NT has always supported the ability to set execute permission on memory independent of read and write permission - look up the VirtualProtect API and the PAGE_EXECUTE flag. It requires hardware support, which has been lacking on x86 until now. AMD's 64-bit processors implement a No-Execute bit in the page table entry when the processor is running in 64-bit mode or in Physical Address Extensions 32-bit mode. Intel's Itanium processors also include an Execute bit in the page table.
Frankly, it's taken far too long to get execute protection on the x86, so AMD should be lauded for finally implementing it.
The Linux patch that another poster referred to: the follow-ups to that message basically damn the proposal on the grounds that it breaks GCC. Things may have changed in 7 years, of course. It works by reducing the length of the Code Segment not to cover the end of the address space - this causes the x86 processor to generate an Access Violation (oops! we're on a *nix - I mean a segmentation fault) if you try to set the instruction pointer outside this range. A clue to the general effectiveness of this proposal lies in the fact that this still isn't included in the kernel source tree (actually, as posted the code had no effect apart from taking another slot in the Global Descriptor Table because the CS register was set to the newly defined USER_HUGE_CS [the old behaviour] on return from taking a trap, and there was no apparent way to set it to anything else).
Replicating this on Windows would limit the number of threads dramatically and require a large change in the way DLLs are loaded. All thread stacks would have to be in the area of memory not covered by the code segment, which would have to be at the end because a segment represents a contiguous sequence of virtual addresses. The No Execute protection allows any virtual address to be protected; rather, that all virtual addresses that don't contain code will be protected by default.
NGSCB is about securing users' data and keys in an area only accessible through secure APIs. It has nothing to do with security vulnerabilities, except that both fall under a very rough umbrella of 'security'.
[edit: confirmed my suspicion about the Linux patch not being included in 2.6, and note that the article was revised after I posted this entry.]